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Abstract: While Franjo Tuñman was the president of Croatia (1990–99), popular 
music and other forms of entertainment were heavily structured around the key 
presidential narratives: Croatia’s political and cultural independence from Yugoslavia, 
and the idea that Croatia’s war effort had been purely defensive. After Tuñman, the 
Croatian music industry had to cope with media pluralism and the transnational 
challenges of the digital era. Patriotic popular music expressed an oppositional 
narrative of Euroscepticism and resistance to the Hague Tribunal, yet Croatia retained 
and expanded its position in the transnational post-Yugoslav entertainment framework, 
undermining a key element of Tuñman’s ideology. 
‘It’s all the same, only he’s not here’?: popular music and political change in post-
Tuñman Croatia 
 
In September 2002, after another summer of protests against the government 
extraditing Croatian generals to the Hague Tribunal, the musician Marko Perković 
Thompson opened his concert at the Poljud stadium in Split by projecting a video 
which featured himself, the singer Ivan Mikulić and the Slavonian tamburica 
ensemble Najbolji hrvatski tamburaši.1 The song, called ‘Sveto tlo hrvatsko’ (‘Holy 
Croatian soil’), lauded the late Croatian president Franjo Tuñman, who had died in 
December 1999. The men sang of Tuñman’s achievements and the sudden appearance 
of critics who had not dared to defy him when he was alive, and Thompson, a veteran 
of the Homeland War, contributed a verse remembering the days when friend had 
stood together with friend to defend Croatia. Tuñman, a politician who had seemed to 
imagine himself the unifier of the Croatian people’s historical divisions (Bellamy 
2003, p. 67), had himself become one of the most divisive figures in recent Croatian 
history. To understand how popular music changed, or whether it changed at all, after 
the decade when Croatian cultural policy flowed from Tuñman’s narrative of the 
nation, one must first consider how it was structured during the Tuñman era.  
Culture and entertainment were heavily politicised during the Tuñman years 
through a range of explicit and implicit narratives, from songs which defined the 
nation in terms of its enemies, history, territory, religion and gender roles to 
                                                 
1 The tamburica is a stringed folk instrument from Slavonia. As Zlatni dukati, Najbolji 
hrvatski tamburaši (‘The best Croatian tamburica-players’) had been at the forefront 
of its revival in popular music during the 1980s and, especially, the 1990s (Bonifačić 
1998). 
arguments among music professionals which contested the validity of pop genres 
depending on how well they implemented the ideological narratives of Croatia’s geo-
cultural identity. Svanibor Pettan (1998, p. 23) showed how the tension over whether 
to represent the nation as innocent or forceful during the Homeland War was played 
out in musical production and Reana Senjković (2002) demonstrated that videos for 
the vast number of new patriotic pop songs produced during the war generally took 
their lead from the visual culture defined by Tuñman and his party, Hrvatska 
demokratska zajednica (HDZ: Croatian Democratic Union). The journalist Darko 
Hudelist (1995, 1998) argued that a policy of ‘spiritual renewal’ based on Tuñman’s 
belief that Serbs and Croats belonged to entirely different historical civilisations had 
led to a state-driven popular music policy which promoted particular musical 
approaches depending on how closely they matched the presidential narrative which 
rejected the Balkans and the East. Thus the producers of ‘Croatian dance’ claimed in 
frequent media appearances that their adaptations of German and Italian house music 
were evidence that Croatia belonged to the West, to the world or to Europe (those 
three goals of presidential discourse) – even though, in Hudelist’s analysis, the lyrics 
and behaviour of the (mainly female) dance singers served only to imitate the ‘newly-
composed folk music’ from Serbia which dance had been supposed to replace 
(Hudelist 1995). Other contributions to this collection explore the political impact of 
Tuñman’s death and the electoral defeat of HDZ; this contribution asks how far 
political change affected popular music and the institutional and conceptual structures 
Tuñman’s state had put in place. Did the change have a lasting effect or was it, in the 
words of the ex-Yugoslav saying, ‘all the same, only he’s not here’? 
Of course, the phrase ‘It’s all the same, only he’s not here’ – ‘Sve je isto, samo 
njega nema’ in the languages now known as Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and 
Montenegrin – is usually associated with Tito, not Tuñman. Indeed, it provided the 
Serbian composer–lyricist Dragan Brajović and the Skopje-born, Belgrade-based 
singer Tijana Todevska-Dapčević with the hook for a satirical pop single in 2005 
which mocked the stereotypes and insecurities of each post-Yugoslav country (the 
song’s Croatians were chiefly famous for marrying themselves off to Europe while 
listening to ‘narodnjaci’ – pop-folk songs – ‘as if we’re Turks’).2 Introducing the 
slogan into a paper on contemporary Croatia serves as a reminder that, even before 
Croatia’s independence, Croatian musicians and music executives had already been 
working in a context where the state aimed to implicate them in communicating its 
own narratives. The concept of the ethno-nation as the constitutive people of 
Tuñman’s Croatia was not so different in form from the construction of the ‘working 
class’ which was to have constituted Tito’s Yugoslavia, even though the content of 
Croatian nationalism rejected outright the Titoist idea that ethnicity should be 
subordinate to the common endeavour of socialism. For a historian, the study of 
contemporary Croatian culture therefore includes (at least) two layers of continuity 
and change: not just the extent to which conditions changed after Tuñman but also 
whether the Tuñman era itself was so great a period of change as, on the surface, it 
appeared.  
A third layer of change is introduced when one considers the transformation of the 
transnational music market since 1999/2000. To analysts of Croatia, the dates 
primarily signify the post-Tuñman period; to global record labels, they stand for what 
the ‘majors’ and recording industry trade associations represent as the most sustained 
crisis in their history thanks to the expansion of broadband technology, internet piracy 
and the consequent decline in music sales. In 2009, the International Federation of the 
                                                 
2 See Mikić 2006. 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimated that, despite the new revenue streams its 
members had devised to cope with digital music, 95 per cent of music downloads 
worldwide still avoided any form of payment to the rights holders.3 The position of 
popular music in entertainment broadcasting was also transformed after 2000 with the 
transnational take-up of reality/talent formats: popular music programming either 
competed for space with reality shows or combined with them to produce talent 
contests such as the Idol franchise (usually characterised by a homogenised, ballad-
driven pop style in whatever country it took place4) and celebrity competitions in 
ballroom dancing and figure skating. These pressures on music sales and promotion 
affected the industry in Croatia as they did elsewhere. A post-conflict paradigm was 
necessary, but not sufficient, to understand the state of Croatian popular music ten 
years after Tuñman’s death. 
 
Structural changes in Croatian popular music since Tuñman 
 
At the start of the 2000s, the major revenue streams and promotional opportunities for 
the Croatian music industry were sales, terrestrial television, radio and live 
performance. Of these, the aspect most directly affected by political change was 
                                                 
3 IFPI, ‘Digital Music Report 2009: New Business Models for a Changing 
Environment’ (2009), available at: http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009.pdf, 
accessed 3 June 2009. 
4 The Serbian record label Grand Productions, which specialises in pop-folk, bucked 
the trend somewhat when it sponsored its own talent show, Zvezde Granda (Stars of 
Grand), on TV Pink – arguably, part of the same discourse of Serbian musical and 
cultural exceptionalism which surrounds the annual Guća brass-band festival.  
television, thanks to the broadcasting reforms introduced by the centre-left 
government of Ivica Račan, who became prime minister in January 2000. Tuñman’s 
Croatia had had only one broadcaster with a national concession, the state-owned 
Hrvatska televizija (HTV: Croatian television). HTV in the 1990s had operated three 
national channels whose programming included several chart-type shows, music 
video slots (to fill gaps in the schedule), Friday- and Sunday-night variety shows and 
an annual calendar of pop festivals.5 The head of HTV’s entertainment department, 
Ksenija Urličić, was keen to describe herself as a Tuñman loyalist; in 1998 she was 
among six HTV editors elected to HDZ’s central committee at Tuñman’s 
recommendation (Lukić 1998). The project to develop new popular music featuring a 
Slavonian stringed folk instrument, the tamburica, was also carried out on HTV 
through a lavish weekly show, Lijepom našom ([Around] Our beautiful [homeland]), 
which was broadcast from towns in every Croatian county each series (later it also 
visited the diaspora) and brought in entertainment stars to sing with tamburica 
groups.6 Music broadcasting in the Tuñman era was also dogged by allegations of 
                                                 
5 The festivals, entertainment events which were hosted in touristically or politically 
significant towns and which often ran for several evenings, were extremely 
characteristic of the 1990s pop industry; they had also been a Yugoslav practice and 
endured in the successor states, although after the break-up of Yugoslavia each new 
state’s pop festivals showcased performers from that particular state. Some became 
more transnational after 2000, particularly the Montenegrin festivals in Budva and 
Herceg Novi.  
6 In later series, the programme’s celebration of traditional culture’s relevance in the 
contemporary world also included a display of folk costumes. Lijepom našom was not 
developed solely within the entertainment department but by one of its presenters, 
corruption and favouritism. Television airplay figures released by Hrvatska glazbena 
unija (HGU: Croatian Musicians’ Union) in 1999 during a dispute with HTV 
appeared to show that vocalists managed by two or three well-connected composers 
dominated HTV’s music programming, at the expense of other union members (Cigoj 
1999). 
Musicians who had not benefited from HTV’s programming policy anticipated that 
political change would bring broadcasting reform and a more equitable deal for access 
to the revenue stream. Reform itself was not long in coming, as Račan’s government 
attempted to introduce a public broadcasting model and dismantle the informal 
networks which had increasingly come to characterise Tuñman’s rule. The 
government first proposed that civil society groups should name a ‘programming 
council’ to appoint the top broadcasting officials, then that the government and 
opposition should cooperate in naming the council members. Both proposals aimed to 
avoid the 1990s situation where the broadcasting structure could be dominated by 
adherents of a particular party; in any case, a number of staff with HDZ connections 
(including Urličić) had already retired soon after the change of government in 2000. 
However, musicians’ groups soon felt marginalised by the new entertainment editors 
who significantly altered programming policy (slashing the number of televised 
festivals and music shows) and justified their decisions by using a discourse of 
modernisation. HTV’s monopoly on national television broadcasting also came to an 
end – fulfilling a long-standing demand of the Organization for Security and Co-
                                                                                                                                            
Branko Uvodić, and the political marketing expert and former fashion designer Rikard 
Gumzej, who was working as a special adviser to Ivica Mudrinić, the head of 
Hrvatska radio-televizija (HRT: Croatian Radio-Television, the parent organisation of 
HTV) (Cigoj 1997). 
Operation in Europe (OSCE) – when two new private concessions were launched in 
November 2000 (Nova TV) and April 2004 (RTL Hrvatska).  
Increased competition among terrestrial television channels satisfied international 
institutions but turned out not to have provided musicians with significantly greater 
opportunities. All broadcasters, especially RTL (which was operated by the German 
media group of the same name and ultimately owned by the Bertelsmann 
conglomerate), concentrated instead on reality and celebrity formats, in keeping with 
their counterparts across Europe. Popular music provided the raw material for the 
three different sets of talent-show series in the mid-2000s, but few contestants made 
the transition to a long-term recording career; several established female singers 
found work as talk-show hosts, and pop stars in general were in demand as 
contestants when HTV acquired the Strictly Come Dancing and Just the Two of Us 
(celebrity duets) franchises. Musicians had more reasons for optimism at first sight in 
the expansion of multi-channel broadcasting on satellite and cable and the eventual 
prospect of digital terrestrial television, which would make several dozen channels 
available to the majority of viewers.   
In 2005, the Autor company, which held the majority stake in Croatia Records, 
was able to launch the Croatian Music Channel (CMC) to compete with satellite and 
cable music channels from ‘all countries of Europe, and so also from those [countries] 
from the region of former Yugoslavia’.7 CMC solely promoted music from Croatian 
record labels, although as a satellite/cable channel it was only available to a minority 
of the population. Moreover, the cross-border reach of multi-channel television – not 
to mention the availability of many music videos and clips on YouTube from 2005 
                                                 
7 CMC, ‘O nama’, available at: http://www.cmc.com.hr/index.php?page=onama, 
accessed 3 June 2009. 
onwards – had more disruptive implications for the national cultural sphere. With 
European satellite broadcasting in its infancy, Richard Collins (1990, p. ix) had 
warned in 1990 of ‘its potential to rupture national communication sovereignty’ as 
television spilled over borders. In the ex-Yugoslav context, Collins’s warning was 
certainly made manifest. Any subscriber in 2007 to the basic package of Adriatic 
Kabel, one of Croatia’s two largest cable operators at the time, could receive CMC 
but also the Serbian channel BKTV, which broadcast copious amounts of pop-folk – a 
major competitor to (and in Tuñmanist discourse an adversary of) Croatian pop. The 
premium package added TV Pink, the Serbian channel more associated with pop-folk 
than any other.8 Musicians frequently expressed frustration at the lack of airplay they 
                                                 
8 Adriatic Kabel subsequently amalgamated with its rival DCM to form B.net, 
Croatia’s dominant cable operator at the time of writing. In June 2009, B.net’s 
packages included channels from all the ex-Yugoslav states except Kosovo under the 
rubric of ‘regional channels’ (OBN and TV Pink BH from Bosnia-Herzegovina plus 
Slovenija 2 and Kanal A from Slovenia in the basic package of channels; TVCG from 
Montenegro and RTS from Serbia, plus FTV from Bosnia, in the extended package). 
In Zagreb, its standard music channels were MTV Adria (the ex-Yugoslav MTV 
franchise), CMC, VH1 (a US pop channel), with an extra music package adding more 
MTV channels, Viva (German pop) and DM Sat. This last, B.net’s own website stated, 
provided ‘a varied mix of musical genres with an emphasis on turbofolk and 
‘zabavna’ [pop] music’ (http://www.bnet.hr/cro/televizija/dm_sat). Subscribers to 
B.net’s extended package also had access to Balkanika Music TV, which broadcast 
videos from all the ex-Yugoslav states (although had no separate entry for Kosovo), 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey. B.net, ‘Ponuda programa’, 
http://www.bnet.hr/cro/televizija/ponuda_programa/(region)/zg, accessed 3 June 2009. 
received on the major Croatian terrestrial channels: in 2006, for instance, some 50 
musicians from Split accused the media of ‘the systematic destruction of Croatian 
music’.9  Television was neither the secure revenue stream nor the protectionist 
bastion it had been under Tuñman. 
A pluralised recording industry structure paralleled the state of post-Tuñman 
broadcasting, although the music industry had hardly been a political priority. The 
1990s recording industry had been dominated by Croatia Records (CR; the post-
Yugoslav incarnation of Zagreb’s largest record label, formerly known as Jugoton) 
with a small role for Orfej, the discographic department of the state broadcaster. Four 
independent record labels (Aquarius, Dallas, Dancing Bear and Menart) had acquired 
CR’s licence agreements with the global majors in the mid-1990s and invested the 
proceeds in developing their domestic rosters until they could offer the largest 
Croatian acts more attractive terms. The fifth new label, Hit Records, was founded in 
2003 and belonged to the same entrepreneur, Juraj Hrvačić, whose national radio 
station, Narodni radio (Popular/People’s/National Radio), was the only national all-
music station with a fully ‘domestic’ playlist.10 ‘Domestic’, in practice, meant 
Croatian, although musicians from another ex-Yugoslav state who had a direct 
Croatian record deal were reckoned as ‘domestic’ for airplay purposes.  
Besides a radio station and a record company, Hrvačić’s promotional network also 
included local television (e.g. the Z1 channel in Zagreb) and the Hrvatski radijski 
                                                 
9 Jutarnji list, 3 February 2006. 
10 Other national stations contained blocks of music programming; Zlatko Turkalj, an 
editor–presenter at Hrvatski radio (Croatian Radio), was particularly well-known for 
his support of ‘domestic’ music. Hrvačić also owned another national station which 
played foreign (English-language) music, Otvoreni radio (Open Radio). 
festival (HRF: Croatian Radio Festival), the only annual pop festival to have 
flourished and grown since the cutbacks in HTV’s support for them.11 Although it was 
in private hands, this was perhaps the nearest equivalent to the entertainment 
promotion complex the state had enjoyed during the 1990s – and it received similar 
criticism for imposing a narrow-minded musical section on the population. Besides 
this national station, the Croatian radio offering remained extremely localised, so that 
access to a wider choice of music depended on the stations available in a particular 
area. In the Slavonian town of Vinkovci (renowned for punching above its weight on 
the Croatian music scene), staff at the radio station VFM expressed a strong 
commitment to an ‘urban’ worldview and set themselves high programming criteria; 
outside its transmitter’s 50 km radius, the rest of Slavonia had no such resource.  
The most newsworthy angle on internet music was the easy online availability of 
music which celebrated the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) – a Nazi satellite 
state during the Second World War – its leader Ante Pavelić and his movement and 
army, the Ustaše (see Senjković and Dukić 2005); beyond this headline-friendly topic, 
however, the new medium posed long-term challenges to the music industry as a 
whole. The Croatian recording industry was slow to adapt to the digital marketplace, 
although Menart signed deals with web music shops including eMusic, iTunes and 
Amazon which enabled its recordings to be purchased in many territories outside 
Croatia. Aquarius eventually founded its own web shop (cedeterija.hr) which sold full 
albums in MP3 format from its own artists and some other Croatian labels; however, 
individual Croatian songs could often be purchased more easily from a Serbian 
website (where they appeared as releases by City Records, which held the Croatia 
                                                 
11 HRF had first been broadcast on a network of local channels and then moved to 
Nova TV, so did not depend on HTV. 
Records licence for Serbia) than from anywhere in Croatia.12 Digital rights 
management (DRM) presented a partial solution for Croatia Records, which 
employed EMI’s Copy Control technology on many of its most important releases for 
several years: the software included extra data tracks to prevent users ripping the 
audio tracks as digital files but ultimately failed to prevent the songs appearing online, 
perhaps from systems which had bypassed the DRM or perhaps from ripped licence 
releases which did not use the technology. An alternative response to the sales crisis 
was the ‘kiosk model’ for physical record sales where consumers could buy particular 
CDs with a daily newspaper at a heavy discount.13 For listeners themselves (who 
might, or more likely might not, be ‘consuming’ and purchasing online), the internet 
offered access to popular music which did not easily fit the programming policies of 
the traditional Croatian media – whether one-hit dance wonders from one’s childhood, 
new or old music from elsewhere in former Yugoslavia, Ustaša songs edited into a 
video montage of footage from Croatia’s wars, or the musical glue of numerous taste 
cultures which did not find expression in (and indeed rejected) mainstream 
entertainment.  
 
Patriotic popular music, the ICTY and Euroscepticism 
                                                 
12 http://www.yu4you.com/trazi.php?terms=City+records&lang=sr, accessed 3 June 
2009. 
13 Marta Bozina, Kosjenka Dumančić and Blaženka Knežević (2006), ‘The Impact of 
Internet on IPR: A Case Study of Music Industry in Croatia’, Dynamics of Institutions 
and Markets in Europe, Working Paper 16, available at: http://www.dime-
eu.org/files/active/0/IPR-%20WORKING-PAPER-16_Bozina-et-al.pdf, accessed 3 
June 2009. 
 The most visible interface of popular music and politics after Tuñman was the 
production of patriotic popular music which emphasised the experiences of veterans 
from the Homeland War (the universal Croatian name for the war against the 
Yugoslav National Army and the Croatian Serb forces) as well as the need to 
revitalise faith in God and the family. At the heart of the veterans’ experience, as 
represented in this music, was the betrayal of supposed war heroes by co-nationals 
who had asked awkward questions about soldiers’ criminal actions during the war and 
co-operated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY or ‘Hague Tribunal’). Several of the men who performed this music (for most 
of the decade after Tuñman, it was a male preserve) were star attractions for their 
record companies. Marko Perković Thompson and Miroslav Škoro dominated 
Croatia’s (airplay-based) music charts with each new single. Dalibor Bartulović-
Shorty, a rapper from Vinkovci, crossed over from the hip-hop scene into mainstream 
pop after releasing a song about his home town which wrote Homeland War memory 
directly into the history of Slavonia.14 Niko Bete, the performer of one campaign 
anthem which promoted Ante Gotovina’s heroism and innocence and two similar 
anthems for Mirko Norac,15 did not achieve the same commercial prominence, but his 
                                                 
14 See Baker 2009, pp. 40-43. 
15 Gotovina and Norac were Croatian generals who had both been indicted for war 
crimes and fled from justice. Gotovina was indicted in July 2001 for crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war committed during Operation 
Oluja (Storm) in August 1995, the Croatian Army’s final offensive against the 
Croatian Serbs. He remained at large until December 2005, when he was arrested in 
Tenerife. Mirko Norac spent sixteen days on the run from a Croatian arrest warrant in 
songs – especially the Gotovina anthem, ‘Ante, Ante, svi smo za te’ (‘Ante, Ante, 
we’re all with you’) – were ever-present in the soundscape of demonstrations in 
support of the fugitive general. 
The most famous and most controversial of the post-Tuñman patriotic musicians, 
Thompson, drew extra authenticity from his service as an army volunteer defending 
his home village during the Homeland War. He had composed his debut hit, ‘Bojna 
Čavoglave’ (‘Čavoglave platoon’),16 during and about that experience; it made his 
biography an inextricable part of his celebrity persona and remained a fixture in his 
concert repertoire, despite the introduction’s incorporation of the slogan ‘za dom 
spremni’ (‘Ready for the Home[land]’), which had been used by the Ustaše.17 In 
                                                                                                                                            
February 2001 and was indicted the next month with four other men on charges of 
murder in the Gospić pocket in October 1991. Norac was convicted by a Croatian 
court in March 2003 and, in 2004, further indicted by the ICTY for crimes committed 
in the Medak pocket in 1993. The case was transferred to Croatian jurisdiction and he 
was convicted on this indictment in May 2008 for failing to stop his soldiers killing 
and torturing Serbs. See Pavkalović, this volume. 
16 The standard translation of ‘bojna’ is ‘battalion’. However, the Čavoglave unit, 
consisting of local men who had taken up arms to defend the area after the regular 
Croatian forces, was self-evidently not of battalion size. Calling it a bojna may have 
helped present an image of a larger force to the enemy and/or reflected the fluidity of 
Croatian military organisation and vocabulary in autumn 1991. Thanks to Dejan Jović 
and Louise Askew for their advice on this translation. 
17 The argument in defence of the slogan claims that the Ustaše were not the first to 
use the slogan because it combines war cries used by two historical Croatian heroes: 
Nikola Šubić Zrinski (who held off Suleiman the Magnificent’s Ottoman forces at the 
Croatian public discourse, where moral authority to speak about the consequences of 
the war was normatively reserved for those who had made sacrifices in it (soldiers, 
mothers, refugees), Thompson was able to credibly express the dissatisfaction of 
veterans not only after Tuñman but even in the late 1990s. His first song on the theme, 
in 1998, railed against veterans’ loss of power and dignity since the war; in its video, 
it also opposed the trial of the Bosnian Croat colonel Tihomir Blaškić at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  
The veterans’ movement of the late 1990s had enjoyed a friendly relationship with 
Tuñman’s government; its position in politics altered significantly during the brief era 
of centre-left rule, when Ivica Račan (the former leader of the Croatian League of 
Communists, turned democratic socialist) served as prime minister and an avowed 
liberal, Stipe Mesić, had been elected president. The most active veterans’ group, 
Udruga hrvatskih vojnih invalidi iz Domovinskog rata (HVIDRA: Association of 
Croatian War Invalids from the Homeland War) took an prominent role in the right-
wing protest movement which sought to undermine the Račan government and 
perhaps even to provoke so much disorder that it would be impossible for Račan to 
govern (Fisher 2003, p. 75). Thompson increasingly oriented his repertoire around 
history, war memory, faith and his love for his native region (topics he had begun to 
explore in the late 1990s), and his next album, in 2002, focused almost exclusively on 
                                                                                                                                            
siege of Sziget) used ‘za dom’, while King Petar Krešimir IV (1059–74) used 
‘spremni’ in defiance of Venice. See, e.g., Goran Rohaček (vice-president of Hrvatska 
čista stranka prava: Croatian Pure Party of Right), ‘Neznanje je majka svih zala’, 
Hrvatska čista stranka prava, available at: 
http://www.hcsp.hr/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1216038493&archive=&start
_from=&ucat=3, accessed 3 June 2009. 
‘patriotic’ themes. His back-story as a veteran was one of the best-known stories in 
Croatian entertainment and was reinforced by his practice of opening each concert 
with ‘Bojna Čavoglave’.18  
A series of scandals from 2003 onwards built up a widespread (but not all-
encompassing) public perception of Thompson as an extremist, complicating his 
claims to stand for the entire Croatian people. In February 2003, a small group of 
audience members gave Ustaša salutes at a free Thompson concert on Trg bana 
Jelačića (the central square of Zagreb) during the introduction of ‘Bojna Čavoglave’ 
when Thompson, as usual, sang the words ‘za dom’ and had the crowd respond 
‘spremni’; that November, the owners of two concert venues in the Netherlands asked 
Thompson not to perform; a month later, an internet portal publicised bootleg 
recordings of a singer it claimed to be Thompson performing Joško Tomičić’s song 
‘Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara’ (‘Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška’), which glorified mass 
murder in the Ustaša concentration camps; the organisers of Thompson’s next 
stadium concerts in 2007 stated they would ban concert-goers from bringing flags or 
clothing which referenced the NDH or Pavelić, yet the usual photographs of black-
clad teenagers displaying the telltale ‘U’ and saluting still occupied the media for 
several days; during his diaspora tour, Thompson encountered complaints and/or had 
concerts cancelled in Austria, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and the USA – but not 
Germany; a police inspector who reported Thompson for expressing hatred towards 
national minorities after another free concert was suspended himself; Istrian 
regionalist politicians began to stand up to Thompson concerts in their localities. In 
the meantime, Thompson’s fellow musician Miroslav Škoro had positioned himself as 
                                                 
18 From 2007, his concerts opened instead with the first song on his 2006 album, 
which called on contemporary society to turn away from sin. 
a more centrist patriotic singer who was not dogged by the same connotations of 
extremism.  
Škoro and Thompson had recorded several songs together and shared the basic 
theme of heroic veterans betrayed by traitors inside and enemies outside the nation; 
both also used frequent historical references in their patriotic lyrics, although Škoro 
avoided any allusions to the Partisan–Ustaše conflict or the Communist persecution of 
Croat nationalists. The writer Miljenko Jergović (2005) called Škoro ‘the Thompson 
of the new government’, likening him to the prime minister since 2003, Ivo Sanader. 
Sanader himself had given a fierce anti-Račan speech during the largest pro-Gotovina 
rally on the Split Riva in 2001; after beating Ivić Pašalić’s hard-line wing to the HDZ 
leadership at the next party congress, he had appeared to mellow into a centre-right 
leader in the Christian Democrat tradition, whose foreign policy aimed at integrating 
Croatia into the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 
opposing view, that no good and much ill would come of sacrificing Croatia’s hard-
won sovereignty, was rarely heard in the consensus of the major parties but resonated 
among many ‘fringe’ parties and in everyday life. 
The patriotic popular music of the post-Tuñman period was coloured with an 
increasing amount of Euroscepticism – a term which originated from British political 
discourse and stands for suspicion of the European Union (EU) as a threat to national 
sovereignty. The British and Dutch governments’ frequent demands to postpone 
Croatia’s accession negotiations until Gotovina had been arrested are likely to have 
contributed to a perception that the EU as an institution cared little for Croatian 
national interest; moreover, Dejan Jović (2006, pp. 88–90) has argued that, during the 
late stages of Tuñman’s rule, the once-desired ‘Europe’ itself became an Other in 
presidential discourse as a result of Tuñman’s disappointment with the EU’s ‘Western 
Balkans’ strategy. While Tuñman continued to define the nation against ‘the Balkans’, 
Yugoslavia and ‘the East’, he also came to consider that ‘Europe’ as an institution 
would threaten Croatia’s political and cultural self-sufficiency. This ‘paradox of the 
west’ arguably lay behind late Tuñmanism’s tendency towards cultural autarky.  
Euroscepticism had less impact on the development of Croatian popular music as a 
whole after Tuñman, yet particular musical texts still contained a strong Eurosceptic 
strand. The discourse of the anti-ICTY protests flowed into a generalised opposition 
to the EU through the idea of the internal traitor, who was as much in focus as was the 
external European threat to sovereignty. Shorty used one single from his second 
album to criticise Croatians whom he considered to be pandering to Europe and 
disdaining authentic values such as respect for Slavonia’s suffering during the 
Homeland War.19 A song by the tamburica group Mladi 6 focused on the ‘ex-
comrades’ (i.e. ex-Communists) who now pretended to care about Christ although the 
narrator remembered them as atheists: they had already sold off the islands and were 
now getting around to the waterways, but should not touch the plains (the narrator 
warned, referencing the title of Miroslav Škoro’s debut wartime hit) because ‘we’ had 
gone to war and died for them. Other songs by Thompson and Škoro made more 
abstract allusions to strange malevolent outsiders and the flawed members of the 
nation who were in cahoots with them.  
Grassroots Euroscepticism overlapped with and outlasted the pro-Gotovina 
campaign, while several political parties used a discourse of the EU as a neoliberal 
front for large corporations which would exploit Croatia’s natural resources. Croatian 
                                                 
19 One sequence in the song’s video showed him in jail while a man in a white shirt 
with an EU armband was evaluating him on a clipboard as a ‘primate’; later on, he 
punched through an EU emblem on the screen. 
Euroscepticism comprised a field of stances towards Europe. The 2007 manifesto of 
Ivic Pašalić’s mid-2000s political party Jedino Hrvatska (Only Croatia) said that it 
distinguished Europe from the EU because ‘Europe was the centre of world 
civilisation and the EU was an unequal community of states’;20 Shorty’s attack on 
Europe had made no distinction between the civilisation and the institution. The 
discourses were nonetheless compatible enough that they could be seen as one strand 
of thought in entertainment as well as political life. The anthropologist Michaela 
Schäuble has interpreted veterans’ disaffection, angry posturing and willingness to 
shock as an expression of powerlessness in the face of globalisation as it played out in 
the small towns and city outskirts of Croatia, not to mention an expression of their 
resentment that Europe and the USA had not intervened to prevent Croatia having to 
fight for independence.21 
Not only Euroscepticism and globalisation but also the politics of post-Communist 
memory were played out in Croatian popular music, just as, in other post-socialist 
countries such as Hungary or the Baltic states, the same conflicts centred on 
monuments, museums and the use of public space. Dislike of Thompson involved not 
only the symbolic distancing strategies of references to the Balkans, peasants, the 
mountains and Herzegovina, which Stef Jansen (2005) apostrophised as ‘anti-
nationalism’ when he encountered them in the mid-nineties, but also a clash of 
                                                 
20 ‘Stranka Jedino Hrvatska najavila izlazak na izbore’, available at: 
http://www.javno.com/hr/hrvatska/clanak.php?id=81036, accessed 3 June 2009. 
21 Michaela Schäuble, ‘“Imagined Suicide”: Self-Sacrifice and the Making of Heroes 
in Post-War Croatia’, Anthropology Matters 8 (2006), 1, available at: 
http://www.anthropologymatters.com/journal/2006-1/schauble_2006_imagined.pdf, 
accessed 3 June 2009. 
incompatible historical narratives about the Second World War. The overtones of 
memory politics became explicit in 2008 in a confrontation between Thompson and 
the Istrian regionalist MP, Damir Kajin, who lobbied for the cancellation of 
Thompson concerts in Umag (near the time of an international tennis tournament) and 
Pula (where Thompson’s management proposed to hold the concert in the 
municipally-owned Roman arena). 
The complex relationship between Istrian and Croatian identity was mediated in 
Istria by a discourse of Istrian tolerance, which Istrians understood as the result of the 
region’s historical experience and considered made them more Croatian than the 
hyper-nationalism of ‘Balkan’ regions of the country (Kalapos 2002, p. 85). Kajin 
epitomised this narrative of Istrian identity when he stated that ‘Istria cared about 
Croatia in a different way’ and added that the values which defined Istria made it 
different from Sinj or Čavoglave’.22 He also stated, as columnists opposed to 
Thompson had for years, that Serbian pop-folk concerts were attended by ‘the same 
audience which goes to a Thompson concert’.23 Later, at a concert in Križevci (central 
                                                 
22 T Kocijančić, ‘Umag nije Bandićev Zagreb’, available at: http://www.sdp-
umag.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=530, accessed 3 June 2009. 
Sinj is the birthplace of Mirko Norac and the location of the Alka, the annual jousting 
festival which became a key site of resistance to Račan and Mesić during the early 
2000s protests. See Schäuble, 2009. 
23 Gorana Banjeglav, ‘Neka Thompson pita kuma zašto su cajke u Istri’, Javno, 14 
August 2008, available at: http://www.javno.com/hr/hrvatska/clanak.php?id=172220, 
accessed 3 June 2009. Kajin was responding to accusations that it was hypocritical to 
obstruct Thompson while Serbian pop-folk singers were able to perform at nightclubs 
in Istria. 
Croatia), Thompson told his audience that ‘we’ll also come to Istria, to Pula, to the 
Arena, to the parts where there is still Communism. We’ll kill Communism.’24  
Kajin, when asked for his comment on Thompson’s statement, presented a counter-
narrative in which the Communists had had a positive, even a patriotic, effect on 
Istria’s history (Italy, not Yugoslavia, had possessed Istria between the First and 
Second World Wars; Fascist rule had imposed forced Italianisation policies on Istria 
until 1943, when the Partisans had taken control of the region). ‘We do not intend to 
reject those values our grandfathers and fathers fought for,’ Kajin said; and he added 
that most of Thompson’s audience in Istria (as per the discourse that nationalism and 
intolerance were associated with recent migrants from ‘backward’ regions) would be 
‘people who have come in the last 20 to 25 years’ rather than ‘autochthonous 
Istrians’.25 The transnational memory politics of post-Communism found their 
Croatian expression in the recontextualised discourses around folk culture, urban 
development and internal migration which had existed since industrialisation, itself a 
product of socialism, had altered the demography of Yugoslavia’s cities. 
 
The (re-)construction of a post-Yugoslav musical space 
 
The Narodni radio/Hit Records promotional complex headed by Juraj Hrvačić was 
heavily involved in disseminating new patriotic popular music. Miroslav Škoro was 
on the Hit roster; Shorty was signed to Aquarius but owed his crossover into the 
                                                 
24 Mladen Starčević, ‘Thompson zbog poruka mržnje neće skoro u Istru’, Javno, 7 
September 2008, available at: 
http://www.javno.com/hr/hrvatska/clanak.php?id=179919, accessed 3 June 2009. 
25 Starčević, ‘Thompson zbog poruka mržnje neće skoro u Istru’. 
mainstream to Narodni radio; the same radio station also sponsored the stadium klapa 
concerts of 2006–07 which made Tomislav Bralić and Klapa Intrade a headline act on 
the back of their single ‘Croatijo, iz duše te ljubim’ (‘Croatia, I love you from the 
soul’) – a patriotic ‘evergreen’ in the making.26 According to Arena magazine, which 
reported sympathetically and regularly on Thompson’s activities, Thompson had held 
a 20 per cent share in Narodni radio since 2004 (Milas 2004). The station also heavily 
advertised Thompson’s concerts in Croatia and abroad. This picture might have 
appeared to justify the arguments made by the weekly Nacional in the 1990s that 
Hrvačić’s media group had been financed by a HDZ ally, the soon-to-be-disgraced 
tycoon Miroslav Kutle, in order to give Ivić Pašalić’s wing of the party continued 
media access in the event that HDZ lost an election and could no longer use the state 
media for its own communication (Maksimović 1999). 
However, the Kutle–Pašalić axis had been dismantled in the last year of Tuñman’s 
rule itself when Kutle was imprisoned, and Ivo Sanader’s defeat of Pašalić for the 
HDZ leadership would have disrupted any such arrangements further. Not only that, 
but Hit Records also began to reintroduce Bosniak sevdah singers such as Hanka 
Paldum and Halid Bešlić into the Croatian music market: sevdah had suffered during 
the 1990s exclusion of ‘eastern’ folk music, and – apart from a few tentative and 
politically-inspired attempts to showcase it as a sign of Croat–Bosniak friendship after 
the formation of the Muslim–Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina – had counted 
as a foreign product. In 2008, Hit even released a compilation of post-2000 songs by 
Neda Ukraden, a Bosnian Serb singer born in the Croatian town of Imotski who had 
recorded many albums for Jugoton until 1990; after 1992, when war broke out in 
Sarajevo and Ukraden moved to Belgrade, the Croatian media had constructed her for 
                                                 
26 A ‘klapa’ is a Dalmatian close harmony group. 
many years thereafter as someone who had rejected a possible Croatian identity and 
thus betrayed her country. A group from Serbia, Trik FX, was also invited to perform 
at the 2008 edition of HRF, the Hrvačić network’s pop festival. This recognition of 
former Yugoslavia as a cultural and linguistic area was hardly in keeping with 
Tuñman’s ideology, which fled from any hint that Croatia had anything in common 
with the Yugoslavia it had left behind. 
The status of popular music from other parts of Yugoslavia in fact presented the 
most apparent case of change in the Croatian music industry after Tuñman. Especially 
at the start of the decade, when the fall of Milošević in October 2000 meant that the 
wartime leaders of Serbia and Croatia had both ceased to govern their countries 
within the space of a year, cultural relations between Croatia and the other ex-
Yugoslav states appeared to be a major talking-point. In 2001–02, three stars from 
Belgrade – ðorñe Balašević, Momčilo Bajagić-Bajaga and (much less problematically) 
Zdravko Čolić – gave their first concerts in Croatia since the break-up of 
Yugoslavia.27 Decisions by Croatian acts to perform in Serbia or Montenegro became 
a business matter rather than the cause for media-fuelled outrage they had been in 
1999, when Alka Vuica, Dino Dvornik and Doris Dragović had accepted the first 
invitations to perform across the well-patrolled political and symbolic border. The 
most problematic aspect of the relationship was Serbian pop-folk, which professional 
discourses during the 1990s had structured as Croatian popular music’s continued 
Other. Many Serbian stars of the 1990s had been connected to the ‘enemy’ regime, 
chief among them Ceca Ražnatović – whose marriage to the paramilitary commander 
Zeljko Ražnatović-Arkan symbolised all possible dimensions of Serbian difference at 
                                                 
27 Čolić was from Sarajevo but had lived in Belgrade since the outbreak of war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). 
once. However, even performers whose careers had begun well after the fall of 
Milošević still came within the boundaries of the inimical other, ‘srpski turbofolk’ 
(‘Serb pop-folk’).28  
If the newly transnational relationships of ex-Yugoslav popular culture could 
initially be conceptualised as a binary between Croatia and Serbia–Montenegro 
(Baker 2006), by the end of the decade this was no longer the case. The growth of 
Montenegro’s own music industry after independence suggested that a national music 
industry was almost as essential a sign of sovereignty as a national anthem or a flag29 
– and retrospectively called attention to whether Croatian popular music, with its 
linguistic similarities to Montenegrin rather than Serbian, might have had some extra 
autonomist significance in pre-independence Montenegro.30 Musical production in 
every ex-Yugoslav state was influenced, in ways which still require further research, 
by the dispersal of musicians from Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) across and beyond 
former Yugoslavia. The musical cultures of pre-war Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo 
and Tuzla were renegotiated through Bosnian performers’ interventions into the 
                                                 
28 ‘Turbofolk’ was originally a satirical coinage by the rock musician Rambo 
Amadeus and later a term for mid-1990s Serbian pop-folk production; in Croatia its 
meaning was more general and included pop-folk of all origins up to the present day, 
with a commonsensical allusion to Serbia. 
29 See Billig 1995. 
30 Standard Croatian used a language variant known as ijekavica and standard Serbian 
used ekavica (ijekavica used the vowel ‘ije’ in many words where ekavica would use 
a long ‘e’ instead); ijekavica was also the basis of Montenegrin, and was spoken in 
much of BiH, although the Serbianisation policies of the 1990s extended the use of 
ekavica in Serb areas. 
musical space of their new host countries, and musicians from BiH (Edo Maajka; 
Davor Sučić-Sula from the Zagreb/Sarajevo branch of the rock band Zabranjeno 
pušenje) arguably provided the most outspoken critique of post-conflict social and 
political realities in ‘urban’ (anti-folk) Croatian music.31 Neither could one overlook 
Macedonia’s position in the reconstituted cultural space of ex-Yugoslav popular 
music after the transnational mourning of the singer Toše Proeski, who had developed 
a parallel career by singing first in Serbian and then also in Croatian before he died in 
a car crash in 2007 on a Croatian motorway outside Nova Gradiška.32 Proeski’s 
posthumous hits in Croatian and English were still fixtures in the Croatian ‘domestic’ 
pop-rock charts more than a year after his death.  
Nonetheless, Serbian culture, music and language remained constitutive Others in 
Croatia, most noticeably in the language policy which applied to popular music. A 
Croatian act covering a song which was originally in Serbian would alter the words to 
                                                 
31 Sučić and his band had been a core member of the Sarajevo ‘new primitives’ 
movement in the 1980s and continued its practices of mocking inequality and 
hypocrisy into the new political circumstances of post-Yugoslavia; Edo Maajka had 
been too young to belong to the movement but his use of humour and Bosnian slang 
had much in common with the creative work of the ‘new primitives’ (although the 
same could not be said for his lyrics’ anger or bad language). Ana Dević, personal 
communication, 27 February 2009. 
32 Proeski had entered the Croatian market by singing duets with Croatian performers 
(as several Bosnian pop singers had also done before him); one of his duet partners, 
Antonija Šola, who had written several of his Croatian songs, subsequently began 
recording in Macedonian. 
use the Croatian rather than the Serbian variant,33 although occasional items of 
Serbian lexis could sometimes be retained. When Ivana Kindl covered a famous 
Zdravko Čolić song, ‘Ti si mi u krvi’ (‘You’re in my blood’), the lyrics retained the 
modal verb construction of the word ‘da’ followed by an infinitive, which was not 
used in standard Croatian;34 when Maja Šuput and the group Feminnem covered 
another one, they kept ‘teatar’ for ‘theatre’ rather than changing it to the standard 
Croatian ‘kazalište’. Čolić’s songs had in any case been in ijekavica, the variant Čolić 
as a Sarajevan spoke. It still seemed that for a Croatian singer to vocalise ekavica was 
beyond the pale. When the group ENI recorded a version of ‘Retko te viñam s 
devojkama’ (‘I rarely see you with girls’) by the Belgrade new-wave rock band Idoli, 
its title and chorus changed to ‘Rijetko te viñam s djevojkama’; in 2006, a Croatian 
tabloid started a polemic about a Croatian singer, Severina Vučković, allegedly 
singing a song in ekavica, based on a Serbian tabloid having transcribed the lyrics into 
ekavica from another variant (Baker 2008, p. 747). 
It was almost a commonplace to observe that, despite the cultural policy of the 
1990s, pop-folk from Serbia in particular was popular among the very generation 
which ought to have been ‘Tuñman’s children’ inculcated with his patriotic values. 
Less clear, however, was whether those ‘children’ attached any political meaning to 
their listening to Serbian pop-folk – even though the national media still tended to 
interpret the popularity of pop-folk as a politically significant phenomenon. Serbian 
                                                 
33 Where a word differed between ‘ijekavica’ and ‘ekavica’ (i.e. it used the vowel ‘ije’ 
in one variant and ‘e’ in another), it would be transposed into the ijekavica word.  
34 However, they reversed the gender of the lyrics so that the female narrator was 
being rescued from ‘strašni haremski čuvari’ (‘terrible harem guards’) rather than 
carrying out the rescue. 
rock was no longer the threat it had been in the mid-1990s, when HGU was able to 
impose sanctions on Croatian musicians who performed with Belgrade bands like 
Partibrejkers in third countries: by 2007, Partibrejkers were able to headline a rock 
festival at Jarun (the lake complex in Zagreb) without complaint. Serbian pop-folk 
was another matter, and was best integrated into Croatia in those areas where the main 
Croatian music and broadcasting organisations were least involved. It had long been 
recognised that the black market had sustained cultural interaction between Croatia 
and Serbia/Bosnia despite the 1990s policy which sought to insulate Croatia from its 
‘former neighbours’; the pirate cassettes and CDs sold on market stalls had since been 
matched if not overtaken by internet file-sharing, MP3 blogs and the anarchic grey 
market of YouTube, where users in Croatia and across the diaspora uploaded clips 
from old video tapes or re-recordings of archive material broadcast on television. 
During the early 1990s, watching videos imported from the homeland had been a 
frequent social activity for families and neighbours in the Croatian diaspora (Kolar-
Panov 1997): a decade later, the same tapes provided resources for a dispersed, virtual 
and casual community. 
Serbian pop-folk found its place at the decentralised margins of the music industry. 
From 2002 onwards, when the classic Serbian pop-folk star Miroslav Ilić toured 
several discotheques in Croatia, nightclubs gradually increasingly began to book 
Serbian as well as Bosnian performers in their pop-folk programmes; one proprietor, 
Alen Borbaš from Osijek, positioned himself as Croatia’s leading folk entrepreneur by 
organising an annual folk awards ceremony in his nightclub (he was only able to use 
the city stadium instead when Anto ðapić ceased to be mayor of Osijek).35 The 
                                                 
35 Borbaš went on to launch Folk magazine and act as the Croatian representative for 
Balkanika television. 
mobile phone ringtone market, aimed at youth, was perhaps the most successful of all 
in accommodating Serbian pop-folk. Ringtone advertisements in magazines and free 
newspapers offered a selection of recent hits divided into categories, one of which 
would always be folk (and would ‘even’ include a few hits by that benchmark of 
otherness, Ceca Ražnatović). The ringtone market drew little attention in comparison 
to the music industry’s other revenue streams, but in everyday life was nonetheless 
significant to its consumers, whose choices of ringtone could signal the presence of 
themselves and their personal technology many times a day. The cracks in a 
prescriptive Croatian national cultural sphere appeared to come precisely at this 
everyday level.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The greatest continuity in the relationship between popular music and politics after 
Tuñman appeared to be the narrative that Croatia’s innocent, defensive and heroic war 
meant that none of its participants could have committed war crimes; Tuñman had 
striven to instil it as common sense into the boundaries of Croatian public discourse, 
embedding silence over war crimes, murders of Serbs, ethnic cleansing and Croatian 
politicians’ own expansionist ambitions in BiH within the all but indisputable concept 
of a nation rising up to resist aggression. After Tuñman, the formerly-presidential 
narrative’s undertones of Euroscepticism came into the foreground as the Croatian 
state became further implicated in networks of international governance and capital 
and Croatia’s relationship with the Hague Tribunal became a European affair. The 
standpoints of the large-scale right-wing publicity campaign which had marked 
Račan’s ministry were defeated on a party political level: Ivić Pašalić founded two 
parties after he left HDZ but neither came close to winning a seat in the Sabor 
(parliament), and the far right contained too many splinter groups to be electorally 
effective. The most successful far-right option was the Croatian Party of Right (HSP) 
led by Anto ðapić, but even this only won eight seats at the 2003 elections and a 
single seat in 2007. At the same time, the strand of popular music which 
communicated the discourses of Pašalić and HSP was one of Croatia’s most reliably 
successful showbusiness products. Indeed, both Pašalić and ðapić attempted to 
connect their own parties to Thompson’s image and popularity: the HSP anthem was 
an otherwise unreleased song by Thompson and remained so even after Thompson 
left the party,36 in 2007, Pašalić’s party of the time gave away promotional scarves in 
the Croatian national colours (red and white check) outside Thompson’s concert at the 
Maksimir stadium in Zagreb and the scarves appeared in several press photographs 
from the concert.  
Although the oppositional patriotic narrative faded from mainstream party politics 
and ceased to set the tone for mass demonstrations on the scale seen in the early 2000s, 
the sentiments of the histrionic anti-Račan years were preserved in popular culture 
through the continued performance, airplay and sale of that period’s oppositional-
patriotic popular music. Music which communicated the protestors’ ideas was 
evidently appealing and profitable enough for performers and executives to continue 
producing it. Thompson’s record label Croatia Records reported that the 45,000 
copies of his album ‘Bilo jednom u Hrvatskoj’ (‘Once upon a time in Croatia’) sold in 
                                                 
36 At the time of writing, the party’s main site no longer attributed the anthem to any 
musician; two regional branch websites in Osijek–Baranja county and Slavonski Brod 
still attributed it to Thompson.  
2007 made it the label’s best-seller of the year.37 Yet the appeal of oppositional-
patriotic music did not translate into political capital: at the 2007 general elections, 
Pašalić and his party received 15,902 votes,38 far fewer even than the number of 
people present at Thompson’s concert at Maksimir. Had Thompson’s many fans 
wanted to express their support at the ballot box for the parties which most closely 
matched the discourse of Thompson’s own songs, they would have had ample 
opportunity to do so, yet participation in a concert audience – even joining in the 
chants and salutes which could be guaranteed to scandalise the next morning’s curious 
press – did not seem to be carried over into political participation. The observation 
raises a provocative, even unwelcome, question: whether the experience of taking part 
in such an audience in fact siphoned off the enthusiasm to display and demonstrate in 
other spheres which might have accreted if Thompson and his concerts had not been 
there.  
Patriotic popular music in the vein of Thompson and Škoro certainly appeared to 
be commercially viable enough to outlast the opposition to Račan, the flight of 
Gotovina and the demystification of Norac.39 Perhaps, as a schoolteacher in Slavonia 
                                                 
37 Croatia Records, ‘Thompson – Bilo jednom u Hrvatskoj, uživo: Split Stari Plač’, 18 
January 2008, available at: 
http://www.crorec.hr/crorec.hr/vijest.php?OBJECT_ID=601008, accessed 3 June 
2009. 
38 Državno izborno povjerenstvo Republika Hrvatske, ‘Službeni rezultata izbora za 
zastupnike u Hrvatski Sabor’, 22 December 2007, available at: 
http://www.izbori.hr/2007Sabor/rezultati/rezultati_izbora_sluzbeni.pdf, accessed 3 
June 2009. 
39 See Pavlaković, this volume.  
commented to me when I visited the region, it continued to be produced for the simple 
reason that the market of men who identified themselves within the social 
classification of ‘veterans’ was several hundred thousand strong (not to mention their 
teenage children), albeit low in individual purchasing power. However, certain 
musical texts, such as the Niko Bete songs for Norac and Gotovina, circulated widely 
(indeed, were sometimes ‘officially’ distributed for free) without corresponding 
commercial gain in measurable sales for their performers. Some but not all large 
concerts were also free at the point of attendance,40 although it was in any case a 
common practice for local councils to finance free concerts (by a range of musicians) 
in their locality on public holidays or other significant dates. From one point of view, 
the financial model of patriotic music might appear to bear out the argument of the 
business analyst Chris Anderson that distributing a product for free enables it to ‘go 
viral’ and reach more people who would be prepared to pay for something you 
produce.41 Alternatively, one might consider that the rules of the cultural economy did 
not necessarily apply to post-Tuñman patriotic music on the grounds that its goal was 
not concerned with the exchange-value of the musical product (trading sound 
recordings, concert admissions, royalties or performance fees for money) but rather 
with maintaining the values communicated through the music in a prominent position 
in everyday life. 
                                                 
40 Including Thompson’s annual celebration of the end of the Homeland War (and 
Operation Oluja) in Čavoglave and both his controversial concerts on Trg bana 
Jelačića (in 2003 and 2008).  
41 Chris Anderson, ‘Free! Why $0.00 is the Future of Business’, Wired, 25 February 
2008, available at: http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-03/ff_free, accessed 
3 June 2009. 
Focusing on patriotic popular music as the meeting-point of music and politics in 
Croatia would seem to suggest that Tuñman’s success in structuring public discourse 
extended beyond his death, the electoral rejection of HDZ in 2000 and Sanader’s 
defeat of the party hard-liners before HDZ returned to power in 2003. Yet the 
situation of Croatian popular music as a whole (music where national identity was 
signalled implicitly not explicitly – through knowledge of the performer’s nationality, 
use of the Croatian language, musical arrangement and the locations of songs’ videos) 
presents a different perspective. Seen from this angle, Tuñman’s cultural policy 
fundamentally failed in creating a Croatian national consciousness which did not 
relate to Yugoslavia. The generation of children who grew up during and after 
Tuñman’s rule still listened to new as well as old music from the rest of former 
Yugoslavia and, as musicians, participated in musical projects across the borders 
which had only existed as state boundaries since their childhood. The image of 
aspiring singers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia (but not Slovenia) competing on the 2008 reality show Operacija Trijumf 
(Operation Triumph), singing duets with established acts from across the region and 
being evaluated by a Croatian composer–manager, a Serbian lyricist and a Bosnian 
television producer would have horrified Tuñman as the threat of a new Balkan 
federation.  
These ‘marketable version[s] of the past’ (OT came several years after a Big 
Brother-style pan-Yugoslav reality show, produced in Macedonia) arguably did little 
to promote a historical understanding of why the real Yugoslavia had collapsed 
(Volčić, 2007, pp. 34–5). A few musical texts – far fewer than in the case of films42 – 
attempted to comment on the architects and consequences of post-Yugoslav violence 
                                                 
42 See Dević, this volume. 
and clientelism, but as a rule popular entertainment did not seek to inspire reflection 
on the activities and failings of power-holders or macro-economic forces. Neither 
should one overstate the impression of a conceptual Yugoslavia being consciously 
reassembled through shared cultural consumption. The reappearance of a common 
Yugoslav marketplace for entertainment (which of course excluded the patriotic 
products intended for national consumption alone) might largely have arisen from a 
pragmatic recognition of a mutually intelligible linguistic area – although even that 
defeated a precept of Tuñman’s ideology, which prescribed that Croatian and Serbian 
should be linguistically distinct. Even though Tuñman’s narrative of the war (and 
sometimes even Tuñman himself) retained a place in the sphere of everyday 
entertainment thanks to the ongoing production of popular music, such texts coexisted 
with an amorphous musical space which bore little resemblance to the ‘spiritually 
renewed’ concept, anti-eastern yet ambivalent towards the West, that Tuñman had 
desired. The political establishment of post-Tuñman Croatia avoided the micro-
management of Croatian culture which had gone on during the 1990s. One is 
nonetheless left to wonder whether politics or technology ultimately did more to 
undermine Tuñman’s attempt to cordon off Croatian cultural space. 
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